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Chance H. Hiner**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Survey period covers some cases that should be of interest to both
consumer and business bankruptcy lawyers. The authors chose issues that
seem to reoccur, including how to get out of bankruptcy by agreement,
what happens to the proceeds of exempt property in a bankruptcy case,
and what the standard is for dischargeability actions. Hopefully, these
and other topics covered below will aid you in your practice.
II. STRUCTURED DISMISSALS
A. IN THE LAND OF STRUCTURED DISMISSALS, THE CODE’S PRIORITY
SCHEME IS STILL KING: THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVES
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IN CZYZEWSKI V.
JEVIC HOLDING CORP.
On March 22, 2017, in a highly-anticipated decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court handed down a 6–2 decision1 in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.,2
resolving the circuit split regarding so called “structured dismissals” that
do not follow the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. The majority held
that a deviation from the Code’s priority rules is not permitted in struc-
tured dismissals over the objection of affected parties.3 This narrow hold-
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Texas and an adjunct professor of Creditors’ Rights at the SMU Dedman School of Law.
** Chance H. Hiner graduated from SMU Dedman School of Law in 2017 and is
serving a one-year term as law clerk to the Honorable Harlin D. Hale.
Contributing practitioners, law students, and externs to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Texas include Jennifer Little from Bracewell Houston; Amber
Carson from Gray Reed & McGraw Dallas; Daley Epstein, Alexa Naumovich, and Elijah
Stone from SMU Dedman School of Law; Tom de la Torre from the University of Texas
School of Law; and Dylan Ross from Notre Dame Law School.
1. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented, arguing that the original ques-
tion presented was “[w]hether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settle-
ment proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme,” but that once
certiorari was granted, petitioners “switch[ed]” the question to “[w]hether a Chapter 11
case may be terminated by a ‘structured dismissal’ that distributes estate property in viola-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.” Justice Thomas was disinclined to answer
the newly presented question because the parties had briefed only the first question, the
justices would benefit from more guidance on the new question from other courts, and he
didn’t want to encourage similar “bait-and-switch tactics.” Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding
Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 987–88 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (first and
third alterations in original).
2. Id. at 978 (majority opinion).
3. Id. at 983.
31
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ing will necessarily require practitioners to secure the agreement of all
parties when proposing a structured dismissal that does not strictly com-
ply with ordinary priority rules and will be a strong weapon in the arsenal
of creditors who feel they are not getting their due in such a structured
dismissal.
Jevic stems from the bankruptcy cases of three affiliated debtors: Jevic
Holding Corp., Jevic Transportation, Inc., and Creek Road Properties,
LLC (collectively, Jevic). After Jevic filed their voluntary petitions under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, their secured creditors were sued by
the unsecured creditors’ committee under fraudulent conveyance law.
Jevic, the committee, and Jevic’s senior secured creditors reached a settle-
ment agreement that contemplated, inter alia, a settlement of the fraudu-
lent conveyance lawsuit, payment of administrative claims in full,
payment to unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis, and the dismissal of
Jevic’s bankruptcy cases. The problem, however, is that the settlement did
not provide for a distribution to a group of truck drivers who had ob-
tained a judgment against Jevic for violations of federal and state Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Acts. Under a Chapter
11 plan or in a Chapter 7 liquidation, part of the truck drivers’ judgment
would have been a priority wage claim entitled to payment ahead of gen-
eral unsecured creditors.
Over the objection of the truck drivers and the United States Trustee,
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. and the U. S.
District Court for the District of Delaware (on appeal) permitted the
structured dismissal because, essentially, it was the better of two bad op-
tions.4 The bankruptcy court noted that the estates were administratively
insolvent and, that without the proposed settlement, it was unlikely that
any constituents outside of Jevic’s secured creditors would receive a
distribution.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the lower
courts.5 Preliminarily, it determined that structured dismissals are permis-
sible under the Bankruptcy Code so long as there is not an attempt to
“evade the procedural protections and safeguards of the plan confirma-
tion or conversion processes.”6 The Third Circuit rejected the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s strict application of the absolute priority
rule to settlements,7 and instead adopted the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit’s more flexible approach.8 This approach holds that
the absolute priority rule does not apply to settlements but the policy
behind the rule does. The Second Circuit emphasized that if a settlement
(and, in turn, a settlement that incorporates a structured dismissal) devi-
4. Id. at 982.
5. In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 184–85 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Aug.
18, 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973
(2017).
6. Id.at 182.
7. Matter of AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 295–96 (5th Cir. 1984).
8. In re Iridium Operating, LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 464 (2d Cir. 2007).
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ates from the priority scheme of § 507, the parties must have “specific and
credible grounds to justify [the] deviation.”9 The Third Circuit acknowl-
edged that such a justification would be rare.10 While the Third Circuit
admitted the decision was a “close call,” ultimately, it held that under
these facts, the bankruptcy court was justified in approving the structured
dismissal because it was the “least bad alternative.”11
The Supreme Court recognized two issues in this case. First, did the
truck driver petitioners have standing to challenge the structured dismis-
sal? Article III standing requires a plaintiff to have sustained an injury
that could be alleviated through a favorable judicial decision. Second, can
a bankruptcy case be terminated by a structured dismissal that does not
comply with the Code’s priority rules? The majority opinion held, first,
that the truck drivers did have standing because overturning the struc-
tured dismissal could possibly redress their injury, and second, that a
bankruptcy court could not approve a structured dismissal that was incon-
sistent with the Code’s priority scheme without the consent of affected
parties.12
The respondents argued that the truck driver petitioners lacked stand-
ing to challenge the structured dismissal because they did not suffer an
injury that could be redressed. Whether or not the structured dismissal
was granted, they argued, the truck drivers were unlikely to recover on
their judgment—the estate simply did not have enough funds to provide
them a recovery.
The Supreme Court disagreed for two reasons. First, the Supreme
Court found that a settlement respecting the priority rules was now possi-
ble.13 After the structured dismissal was negotiated, the WARN lawsuit
against one of Jevic’s secured creditors had concluded. Thus, the secured
creditor may now be amenable to some sort of distribution to the truck
drivers.14
Second, the fraudulent conveyance action against Jevic’s secured credi-
tors could have value to the estate in a Chapter 7 liquidation.15 Alterna-
tively, if Jevic’s case were dismissed, the truck drivers could pursue the
fraudulent conveyance action themselves, which could result in a recov-
ery to them. In sum, because the truck drivers were deprived of a recov-
ery in the settlement and could possibly recover a portion of their
judgment if the structured dismissal was overturned, the Supreme Court
9. Jevic, 787 F.3d at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. Id. at 185–86 (“[W]e believe the Code permits a structured dismissal, even one that
deviates from the § 507 priorities, when a bankruptcy judge makes sound findings of fact
that the traditional routes out of Chapter 11 are unavailable and the settlement is the best
feasible way of serving the interests of the estate and its creditors. . . . [T]his result is likely
to be justified only rarely . . . .”).
11. Id. at 184–85.
12. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983–87 (2017).
13. Id. at 983.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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found that they had standing to challenge the structured dismissal.16
In coming to its ultimate conclusion, the Supreme Court continued its
recent practice of leaning strongly towards the plain meaning of statutory
construction when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code. Citing Justice
Scalia’s oft-quoted tenet that “Congress . . . does not, one might say, hide
elephants in mouseholes,”17 the Supreme Court concluded that § 349(b)’s
allowance of a deviation from a return to the prepetition status quo after
a dismissal “for cause”18 simply does not contemplate a final disposition
of a bankruptcy case that violates the Code’s priority scheme.19 Had Con-
gress intended to allow such a result, the Supreme Court reasoned, Con-
gress would have made such an intent clear.20
The Supreme Court cited two examples to illustrate that even when
structured dismissals have been allowed under the authority granted to
bankruptcy judges under § 349(b) or § 105(a), courts have not suggested
that Congress intended structured dismissals to act as a backdoor around
the Code’s priority scheme. In In re Buffet Partners, L.P. out of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, none of the affected
parties objected to the proposed structured dismissal.21 In Iridium Oper-
ating, out of the Second Circuit, the settlement did not contemplate a
dismissal of the bankruptcy case and merely provided for a distribution of
settlement proceeds to a litigation trust that would pursue claims on be-
half of the estate.22
As a relief to many practitioners, the Supreme Court distinguished—
and arguably acknowledged—first-day wage orders and critical-vendor
orders.23 Unlike structured dismissals, wage orders and critical-vendor or-
ders do not result in a final disposition of a bankruptcy case. Further-
more, they allow the debtor to continue operating as a going concern and
to preserve value for the estate, provide the debtor a higher likelihood of
completing a successful reorganization, and leave even “disfavored” cred-
itors in better positions.24
Even though the Third Circuit held that an acceptable departure from
the priority scheme in structured dismissals would be “rare,” the Supreme
16. Id.
17. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
18. When a bankruptcy case is dismissed, 11 U.S.C. § 349(b) allows a court “for cause”
to modify inter alia the reinstatement of an avoided transfer or a voided lien; allow orders,
judgments, and/or transfers to stand; and to modify the revesting of property of the estate
back into the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b) (West 1994).
19. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 984.
20. Id. “The importance of the priority system leads us to expect more than simple
statutory silence if, and when, Congress were to intend a major departure. . . . [W]e would
expect to see some affirmative indication of intent if Congress actually meant to make
structured dismissals a backdoor means to achieve the exact kind of nonconsensual prior-
ity-violating final distributions that the Code prohibits in Chapter 7 liquidations and Chap-
ter 11 plans.” Id.
21. In re Buffet Partners, L.P., No. 14-30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 3735804, at *4 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014).
22. In re Iridium Operating, LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 465–66 (2d. Cir. 2007).
23. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985–86.
24. Id.
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Court refused to allow even a limited concession to the priority rules.25
The Court expressed doubt that any such exception could be sufficiently
defined and contained, and regardless, noted that the Code did not per-
mit such an exception.26
Practitioners will likely be glad about this limited holding. It dissipates
the fear they held that the Supreme Court would determine the broader
issue, whether structured dismissals in general are a permissible means of
resolving a Chapter 11 case.27 The Supreme Court was careful not to ex-
press an opinion as to the legality of structured dismissals in general. This
narrower holding will allow the continuation of the increasingly common
practice of allowing structured dismissals and should do little to disturb
non-case-dispositive orders in connection with an ongoing bankruptcy
case.
III. EXEMPTIONS
A. ONCE EXEMPT ALWAYS EXEMPT: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SOLIDIFIES
THE FINALITY OF IRA PROCEEDS EXEMPTIONS
IN CHAPTER 7—IN RE HAWK
In In re Hawk, a panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, now infamously, reversed course from their previous ruling, af-
firmatively holding that debtors’ funds withdrawn from an exempt indi-
vidual retirement account (IRA) after filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
remain exempt property for the life of the case and beyond, no matter
how or if they are reinvested.28 The Fifth Circuit initially affirmed the
lower court’s decision to compel turnover of proceeds from Chapter 7
debtors’ post-petition liquidation of an exempt IRA. Its reasoning,
largely based on In re Frost, was that the proceeds lost their exempt sta-
tus when not timely reinvested into another exempt IRA within sixty
days.29 That opinion was handed down on July 19. But only seven weeks
later, after granting a petition for panel rehearing, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed. The court found that under Texas law, Chapter 7 debtors’ with-
drawn funds from an exempt IRA post-petition remain exempt, even
when they fail to reinvest those funds into another exempt IRA within
sixty days.30
25. Id. at 986–87.
26. Id. at 987 (“We cannot ‘alter the balance struck by the statute’. . . not even in ‘rare
cases’” (citations omitted)).
27. Others, however, may feel as though this case is another in a line of cases from our
nation’s highest court leaving bankruptcy practitioners and judges “rowing upstream with
an ever-shorter paddle” by reducing options in detriment to the practicalities associated
with real-world bankruptcy cases. Donna Higgins, Jevic Likely to Bring More Certainty, but
Less Autonomy for Judges, 63 No. 23 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENTS
2, 4 (Apr. 13, 2017).
28. Hawk v. Engelhart (In re Hawk), 871 F.3d 287, 293–96 (5th Cir. 2017).
29. In re Hawk, 864 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2017), vacated and superseded on reh’g by id. at
287.
30. In re Hawk, 871 F.3d at 296.
36 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
This case involved Chapter 7 debtors (the Debtors) who under Texas
Property Code Section 42.0021, claimed an exemption for funds held
within an IRA. This act excluded these funds from the bankruptcy estate
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522.31 No party in interest objected to the IRA
exemption in the thirty-day period following the meeting of creditors.32
The Debtors, post-petition and after the objection period had passed,
decided to liquidate the IRA. They did not, however, roll the liquidated
funds into a new exempt IRA. Upon learning of the funds and the actions
taken by the Debtors, the Chapter 7 trustee (the Trustee) filed a motion
for turnover pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542.33 The bankruptcy court ordered
the turnover, reasoning that the Debtors failed to reinvest the funds in
another exempt IRA within sixty days, and thus, under Section 42.0021 of
the Texas Property Code,34 the funds lost their exempt status.35 The dis-
trict court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.36
Reviewing this case for a second time, the Fifth Circuit retreated from
their previous position and affirmed the “snapshot rule” by analyzing
case law concerning Texas homesteads.37 The exempt status of IRA pro-
ceeds was a case of first impression, but parallels could be drawn with
Texas homestead proceeds.38 The Fifth Circuit looked to the application
of the “snapshot rule” regarding homestead exemptions as applied in In
re Frost.39 In In re Frost, the post-petition proceeds from the sale of a
homestead lost their exempt status when a Chapter 13 debtor failed to
reinvest those proceeds in another homestead within six months.40 The
Debtors in the present case argued In re Frost did not apply because the
proceeds were fixed in character as of the date of the bankruptcy filing
and would remain excluded from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate because
the interest was after-acquired property.41 The Fifth Circuit agreed.42
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis hinged on two specifics. First, “the Trustee
did not object to the IRA exemption until well after the time for objec-
tions had passed.”43 The Fifth Circuit found support in 11 U.S.C. § 522(l)
and the Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of § 522(l) in determining
the character of an exemption once the objection period has passed.44
31. Id. at 289.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 289–90.
34. TEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 42.0021 (West 2014).
35. In re Hawk, 871 F.3d at 290.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 291.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 292–93 (citing In re Frost, 744 F.3d 384, 386–89 (5th Cir. 2014)).
40. Id. at 293 (citing In re Frost, 744 F.3d at 385).
41. Id. at 294.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (West 2016) (“Unless a party in interest objects, the prop-
erty claimed as exempt on [the schedules] is exempt.”); see Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
503 U.S. 638, 639, 643–44 (1992) (holding that a party in interest in a Chapter 7 case cannot
contest the validity of an exemption after the statutory thirty-day period for objections
even if the debtor had no colorable basis for claiming the exemption).
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Here, the Debtors filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed the exemp-
tion for the funds held within the IRA account, which no party in interest
objected to.45 Once the thirty-day objection period had passed, the Trus-
tee could not object to the unconditionally exempted funds in the IRA
account.46
Second, Chapter 7 gives debtors a “‘fresh start’ by shielding from credi-
tors . . . postpetition earnings and acquisitions.”47 The panel looked at
this IRA exemption problem in the specific context of a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy to determine if newly withdrawn IRA funds became part of the
estate.48 The Fifth Circuit distinguished In re Frost by viewing it solely in
the context of a Chapter 13 case.49 The Fifth Circuit recognized “Chapter
7 cases and Chapter 13 cases are not meant to always yield the same
results.”50 Pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan, new property acquired after
filing the plan becomes property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1306(a)(1).51 The Fifth Circuit noted § 1306(a)(1) only applies in Chap-
ter 13 cases and that no similar provision applies in Chapter 7 cases.52
There were no means for the Trustee to pull the newly acquired property
into the Chapter 7 estate once the objection period passed and no objec-
tion was made.53 Accordingly, because the Trustee did not timely object
to the claimed exemption, the Debtors were entitled to the liquidated
funds from the IRA account.54
In re Hawk appears to clear up some confusion, mainly regarding the
crossover between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 principles. In the Fifth Cir-
cuit, it is now established that the holding in In re Frost is limited to
Chapter 13 cases. Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 may not be as analogous as
previously believed. Chapter 13 bankruptcy provides a tool to allow some
post-petition property into the estate—§ 1306(a)(1). Because Chapter 7
trustees do not have this same tool, debtors can now rely on the finality
stemming from the lack of objections to exemptions in a Chapter 7. As
after-acquired property, once the time for objection has passed, funds
withdrawn from an exempt IRA account in a Chapter 7 case are, and
forever will be, unconditionally exempt.
B. ANTI-EXTRATERRITORIALITY REDUCED TO ASH: SHEEHAN
PROTECTS DEBTORS WHO CHANGE STATES WITHIN
APPLICABLE 730-DAY WINDOW
The provisions of the Bankruptcy Code governing extraterritorial ex-
45. In re Hawk, 871 F.3d at 295.
46. Id. at 296.
47. Id. at 294, 296 (quoting Harris v. Viegelann, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015)).
48. Id. at 294–96.
49. Id. at 294.
50. Id. at 295.
51. In re Hawk, 871 F.3d at 295–96.
52. Id. at 295.
53. Id. at 296.
54. Id.
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emptions55 continue to challenge courts across the nation. In Sheehan v.
Ash,56 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
examined conflict of law issues familiar to Texas practitioners—may
courts allow debtors to apply the exemptions of their former state of
domicile to property physically located outside of that state? In answer-
ing this question, the Sheehan district court conducted a thorough analy-
sis of the issues and ultimately adopted the same legal approach as the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas’s seminal case In re
Fernandez.57 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s state-spe-
cific interpretation of § 522(b), ruling that Louisiana exemption laws
could apply to the debtors’ personal property in West Virginia.58
Joint debtors (the Debtors) lived in Louisiana from 2011 to March
2015. They subsequently moved to West Virginia, where they filed for
bankruptcy in July 2015. The Debtors owned a house on two acres in
Louisiana worth $65,000. They also owned personal property in both
Louisiana and West Virginia worth $20,771.
Whether the Louisiana exemptions reached the personal property lo-
cated in West Virginia was the central issue on appeal. The Chapter 7
trustee (the Trustee) objected to the notion that a bankruptcy court must
apply out-of-state exemption laws to personal property within its physical
jurisdiction, specifically Louisiana exemption laws to personal property
physically in West Virginia.
The district court prefaced its analysis with an overview of statutory
interpretation. Section 522(b)(3)(A) directs debtors to exempt property
that “is exempt”59 under the law of the former state of domicile, but it
fails to inform as to the scope of those exemptions. Acknowledging the
statute leaves “critical questions unanswered,”60 the district court evalu-
55. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (West 2016). “Extraterritorial exemptions” reflect a choice-of-
law issue regarding whether § 522(b) mandates that a former state of domicile’s exemption
laws should reach out-of-state property and/or whether courts sitting in one state must
apply the exemption laws of another state. The issue typically arises when a debtor moves
to a new state within the 730-day period preceding the petition and seeks to compel the
court in their current state to apply the exemptions of their former state of domicile.
56. 574 B.R. 585, 587 (N.D.W. Va. 2017), aff’d, 889 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2018).
57. No. EP-11-CV-123-KC, 2011 WL 3423373, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2011).
58. Sheehan, 574 B.R. at 597–98.
59. Section 522(b)(3)(A) allows debtors to exempt property:
that is exempt under Federal law . . . or State or local law that is applicable
on the date of the filing of the petition to the place in which the debtor’s
domicile has been located for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of
the filing of the petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a
single State for such 730-day period, the place in which the debtor’s domicile
was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a
longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (West 2016).
60. Such as:
Should the Court strictly construe the phrase “is exempt” and look to what
[Louisiana] courts would allow debtors to exempt in non-bankruptcy ac-
tions? Should the Court look to [Louisiana] law to see if [Louisiana] would
permit out-of-state property to be exempt in bankruptcy? Or should the
Court treat the subsection as a choice of law provision, and simply apply the
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ated three methods of interpreting the statute’s language: (1) anti-extra-
territoriality; (2) preemption; and (3) state-specific.61
The Trustee argued for anti-extraterritoriality, which interprets the
statute to preclude bankruptcy courts from giving “extraterritorial effect
to any state’s exemption laws.”62 The Trustee supplemented his argument
by analogizing to a “presumption against extraterritoriality” in federal
law on an international level,63 and citing constitutional limits on the
states’ sovereign power.64 Rejecting this argument, the district court
noted that the argument “fail[ed] to address the concerns articulated so
effectively by the district court in Fernandez.”65 Anti-extraterritoriality
misplaces Congress’s intent to involve states in regulating bankruptcy ex-
emptions.66 Furthermore, a federal statute that directs federal courts to
adopt a state’s laws for national application does not offend the Constitu-
tion.67 And from a practical standpoint, anti-extraterritoriality would
render the 730-day window pointless because most debtors would end up
applying federal exemptions anyway, which Congress would have simply
mandated had it intended the federal exemptions to apply.68
The preemption interpretation construes § 522(b) as a preemptive
choice-of-law provision.69 In application, a bankruptcy court could apply
a state’s exemption laws to non-residents and out-of-state property re-
gardless of whether the state intended its exemption laws to have extra-
territorial effect.70 The district court explained this interpretation
contravenes Congress’ intent to allow states to implement their own
bankruptcy schemes with limitations on extraterritoriality. And since
neither the bankruptcy court nor the parties advocated for this position,
the district court dismissed it.71
The state-specific interpretation is the majority approach and the one
the district court adopted. It finds a middle ground between the other two
categories and amounts of [Louisiana] exemption to Debtor’s bankruptcy es-
tate, paying no attention to any potential limitations [Louisiana] law might
impose on applying [Louisiana] law outside [Louisiana]? The statute’s terse
command to determine what “is exempt under . . . State” law provides no
clear answer.




63. Id. at 593 (citing, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 1948) (the Alien Tort Statute)).
64. “[The Trustee] argued ‘that the State of Louisiana lacks the power as a sovereign
entity to prescribe exemptions for property which was not within the State of Louisiana on
the date of filing and further that the use of such exemptions is prohibited by the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Id. at 590 (citing Dkt. No. 8-4 at 2).
65. Id. at 593 (citing Fernandez, 2011 WL 3423373, at *7).
66. Id. at 588 (“Congress designed the exemption system . . . to allow states to partici-
pate in th[e] regulation of debtor/creditor relations”) (citing Hovis v. Wright, 751 F.2d 714,
715–16 (4th Cir. 1985)).
67. Id. at 594.
68. Id. at 595.
69. Id. at 596.
70. Id. (citing Fernandez, 2011 WL 3423373, at *6).
71. Id. at 596–99.
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interpretations, allowing debtors to use the exemption laws of a former
domicile for out-of-state property to the extent the state does not ex-
pressly limit the use of its exemptions to in-state residents or in-state
property.72 Moreover, it requires a determination of “whether [the] juris-
diction intends to apply its exemptions to out-of-state property” rather
than whether the jurisdiction has the authority to do so.73 The district
court was “constrained to agree” that the state-specific interpretation
represented the plainest meaning of § 522(b)(3)(A), as well as the most
liberal interpretation that can feasibly apply to the statute.74 The state-
specific interpretation offends neither congressional intent nor constitu-
tional limitations on state power. The district court likewise embraced the
notion that bankruptcy courts should defer to each state’s intent regard-
ing its laws while also interpreting state laws according to “general princi-
ples governing exemptions.”75
The Northern District of West Virginia ultimately affirmed the bank-
ruptcy court’s order, ruling that the application of Louisiana exemptions
to the Debtors’ personal property in West Virginia was proper.76 The dis-
trict court noted the plain language of the Louisiana exemption statutes
and their corresponding case law did not limit the exemption statutes’
applicability to in-state property.77 Thus, six years after-the-fact, Sheehan
validates the Western District of Texas’s approach in Fernandez, albeit
with lukewarm conviction. Although the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court in Sheehan, the door is still open for divergent analyses in the
future. With exemptions varying between states, and Texas’s exemptions
playing a large role in bankruptcy proceedings, this could be a hot topic in
the future.
IV. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS AND PREFERENCES
A. FIFTH CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN AGAIN ON HOMESTEAD RIGHTS OF A
NON-FILING SPOUSE—WIGGAINS V. REED
On February 14, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
entered its opinion in Wiggains v. Reed. It affirmed the bankruptcy
court’s decision that a partition agreement between a debtor and his
spouse was a fraudulent transfer because the debtor had actual intent to
hinder and delay creditors.78 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit found that
the debtor’s wife was not entitled to a one-half separate property interest
in the homestead net proceeds under § 363(j).79
72. Id. at 595.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court did not elaborate on its constraint. Most likely, the state-specific
interpretation is at least the only viable interpretation at this point, if not in fact the in-
tended construction of § 522(b)(3)(A).
75. Id. at 596 (quoting In re Stephens, 402 B.R. 1, 6 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009)).
76. Id. at 592.
77. Id. at 596.
78. Wiggains v. Reed (In re Wiggains), 848 F.3d 655, 662–63 (5th Cir. 2017).
79. Id. at 668.
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Jeremy and Tania Wiggains bought an expensive home in a Dallas sub-
urb. The couple invested heavily in the home, making valuable improve-
ments with the intent to eventually sell it for a profit. After signing a sales
contract for $3.4 million, the Wiggainses executed and filed a partition
agreement (the Partition Agreement). In accordance with Texas matri-
monial law, the Partition Agreement re-characterized the home as sepa-
rate property, with each spouse having “sole and exclusive authority,
management, and control of their separate property.”80 One hour after
recording the agreement, Mr. Wiggains filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Mr. Wiggains claimed an exemption for his separate interest in the
homestead under Texas law, subject to the $155,675 cap in § 522(p) of the
Bankruptcy Code that limits a debtor’s homestead exemption to the ex-
tent homestead value is attributable to non-exempt property that the
debtor, “with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor,” disposed
of within the ten-year period preceding the petition date.81 This section is
deemed the “mansion loophole” and was specifically enacted as part of
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA) in 2005 to address situations, like this, where debtors attempt
to use the homestead exemption to perpetrate some sort of bankruptcy
abuse. In this light, and hearing objections from certain creditors, the
trustee convinced Mr. Wiggains to eventually limit his homestead to
$130,675.
The Chapter 7 trustee sold the home for $3.4 million. After payment of
all liens, claims, and encumbrances, the home netted $568,668.41 in cash.
This was further decreased by disbursement of the homestead exemption
claimed by Mr. Wiggains. On May 5, Mrs. Wiggains initiated an adversary
proceeding, asserting that the Partition Agreement entitled her to a one-
half separate property interest in the net proceeds from the sale, and
seeking a declaratory judgment to that effect. The trustee counterclaimed
to avoid the petition, seeking a declaration that remaining proceeds from
the sale were property of the estate.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas
Division held a day-long trial on these issues.82 At the trial, Mr. Wiggains
testified that upon the advice of counsel, he entered into the Partition
Agreement for the purpose of excluding his wife’s community property
interest in the estate. He understood how homestead laws worked and
knew his home was worth more than the statutory cap. The bankruptcy
court held that Mr. Wiggains’s “sole actual intent in entering the Partition
Agreement was to avoid the effect of the limitation placed on his home-
stead exemption by § 522(p) of the Bankruptcy Code.”83 Likening such
intent to “gamesmanship for the purpose of placing reachable assets
80. Id. at 658.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 522(o), (p) (West 2016).
82. In re Wiggains, 848 F.3d at 659.
83. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)).
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outside of creditor’s reach,”84 the bankruptcy court further noted that
Mr. Wiggains’s “articulated intent to preserve for his family as much as
possible is the same as an intent to shield as much money as possible from
creditors.”85
The bankruptcy court deemed the Partition Agreement a fraudulent
transfer and determined that Mrs. Wiggains had “no right or interest in
the Homestead Net Sale Proceeds by virtue of the Partition Agree-
ment.”86 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the principal
factor was the execution of the Partition Agreement “in the shadow of an
imminent bankruptcy filing,”87 stating that the act “can only be reasona-
bly interpreted as an act done with intent to hinder [or] delay
creditors.”88
The initial decision did not determine the issue of whether Mrs. Wig-
gains was entitled to distribution from some of the net sale proceeds
under § 363(j), which requires the trustee to distribute proceeds of a sale
to a debtor’s spouse or a co-owner if such party has an interest in the
property due to her separate homestead interest stemming from the Par-
tition Agreement.89 On April 20, 2015, she filed a motion in the bank-
ruptcy case to have compensation paid under § 363(j). The bankruptcy
court held a separate hearing on Mrs. Wiggains’s request where she was
the only witness. The bankruptcy court held that Mrs. Wiggains failed to
meet her burden of showing entitlement under § 363(j) or any other pro-
vision of the Bankruptcy Code.90 On September 22, 2015, Mrs. Wiggains
filed an appeal with the district court, and additionally filed a direct ap-
peal to the Fifth Circuit, which agreed to hear her case.
On appeal, Mrs. Wiggains presented two arguments to support the con-
tention that the bankruptcy court clearly erred in finding the Partition
Agreement was made with intent to hinder or delay creditors. First, she
argued that the bankruptcy court failed to engage in a contextual analysis
to determine her husband’s intent in executing the Partition Agreement.
Second, she argued that the bankruptcy court erroneously discounted her
husband’s legitimate interest to preserve her homestead interest.91
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit began with the statutory language itself.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A),
a bankruptcy trustee may avoid any pre-petition transfer of assets by
a debtor “that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the
date of the filing of the petition” if the debtor made the transfer






89. 11 U.S.C. § 363(j) (West 2010).




Establishing that intent to “hinder and delay” is sufficient without in-
tent to “defraud,” the Fifth Circuit examined three cases offered by Mrs.
Wiggains that analyzed the context of a transfer to determine intent. In
the first two cases, the bankruptcy courts denied discharge after undergo-
ing a contextual analysis and ultimately finding actual intent.93 But the
Fifth Circuit found the case at hand more closely aligned with the third
case, Albuquerque National Bank v. Zouhar.94 In Zouhar, “the debtor
‘candidly admitted the purpose of’ his transfer was ‘to shield assets from
creditors.’”95 The bankruptcy court found in Zouhar that direct evidence
of a debtor’s actual intent removed the need for the court to rely on cir-
cumstantial evidence or inferences.96
Mrs. Wiggains argued that the bankruptcy court erroneously found in-
tent to shield assets from creditors in her husband’s express testimony
that he was looking to protect his wife’s assets. But, applying the principle
found in Zouhar, the Fifth Circuit found that “[k]eeping [the] property in
the hands of his wife is the mirror of keeping [the] property out of the
hands of creditors.”97 From a legal standpoint, the Fifth Circuit found
there was no difference between entering the Partition Agreement to
preserve value for the debtor’s spouse and intent to hinder and delay
creditors.98 Emphasizing the importance of deference to the bankruptcy
court’s findings with regard to the issue of intent, the Fifth Circuit found
no clear error.99
Mrs. Wiggains’s second argument was that the bankruptcy court misap-
plied case law protecting a non-debtor spouse’s separate homestead inter-
est in its denial of a distribution to her. According to Mrs. Wiggains,
§ 363(j) of the Bankruptcy Code allows her, as a non-debtor spouse, to
receive a distribution of the net sale proceeds.
Acknowledging the power of a homestead interest under the Texas
Constitution, the Fifth Circuit distinguished the legal interest from the
economic interest. Citing prior Texas cases, the Fifth Circuit said that the
Texas exemption grants only a possessory interest in real property, not an
economic one.100
With this established, the Fifth Circuit looked to see, even upon recog-
nizing that Mr. Wiggains had the requisite intent to hinder and delay his
creditors, whether it needed to accept that Mrs. Wiggains had her own
separate interest requiring a distribution in addition to what was given to
92. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (West 2005)).
93. Brooke Credit Corp. v. Lobell (In re Lobell), 390 B.R. 206, 219–20 (Bankr. M.D.
La. 2008); Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. v. Boudrot (In re Boudrot), 287 B.R. 582, 587–88
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002).
94. 10 B.R. 154 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1981).
95. Id. at 156.
96. Id.
97. In re Wiggains, 848 F.3d at 662.
98. Id. at 662–63.
99. Id. at 663.
100. Id. at 664; see Heggen v. Pemelton, 836 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1992).
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her husband. The Fifth Circuit relied on two relatively recent Fifth Circuit
decisions in concluding that she did not.
In Kim v. Dome Entertainment Center, Inc.,101 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit found for a non-debtor spouse seeking compen-
sation for her separate interest in a homestead that she shared with her
husband.102 But unlike the present case where the purchase of the home
happened well after BAPCPA, the Kims’ estate was a pre-BAPCPA
purchase. In the Kim decision, the Fifth Circuit examined a hypothetical
proposed by Mrs. Kim, economically equating a homestead estate to a
life estate. However, the Fifth Circuit did not fully accept the analogy,
stating that the hypothetical “would seem to overvalue homestead
rights.”103 Additionally Mrs. Kim proposed a Takings Clause argument,
which the court noted would likely be limited to pre-BAPCPA cases, de-
spite not fully briefing the issue.104
In Thaw v. Moser, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit em-
phasized the “important limitation” that the Kim holding put on a Tak-
ings Clause argument, finding the timing to be dispositive.105
Applying the principle set forth in those cases, the Fifth Circuit found
that the Wiggains’ Taking Clause argument would fail based on the post-
BAPCPA purchase of the homestead.106 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the bankruptcy court’s rejection of another Takings Clause-
type challenge that might arise if a state’s regulatory taking is “so unrea-
sonable or onerous as to compel compensation.”107 The Fifth Circuit reit-
erated, as it did in Thaw, that under the Bankruptcy Code, “the sale of
property is not so unreasonable or onerous as to compel
compensation.”108
The Fifth Circuit next addressed whether § 363(j)109 requires distribu-
tion of net proceeds from the sale of a homestead where a non-debtor
spouse claims a separate interest. Subsection (h), referenced in subsection
(j), applies to “the interest of any co-owner in property in which the
debtor had, at the time of the case, an undivided interest as a tenant in
common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety . . . .”110 Their home was
deemed property of the estate by the bankruptcy court under § 541(a)(2),
so subsection (h) did not apply because they no longer had an interest in
the home.
101. 748 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2014).
102. Id. at 650.
103. Id. at 661.
104. Id. at 657, 663.
105. Thaw v. Moser, 769 F.3d 366, 369 (5th Cir. 2014).
106. In re Wiggains, 848 F.3d 655, 665 (5th Cir. 2017)
107. Id. at 666 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001)).
108. Id.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 363(j) (West 2010) (“After a sale of property to which subsection (g)
or (h) of this section applies, the trustee shall distribute to the debtor’s spouse or the co-
owners of such property, as the case may be, and to the estate, the proceeds of such sale,
less the costs and expenses, not including any compensation of the trustee, of such sale,
according to the interests of such spouse or co-owners, and of the estate.”).
110. Id. § 363(h).
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Last, the Fifth Circuit touched on the lower court’s finding that “special
circumstances” did not exist which could merit an increase in recovery to
the non-debtor spouse over the debtor’s § 522(p) monetary cap.111 The
Fifth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court that there was nothing
confiscatory in this case, pointing to the short time the Wiggainses lived in
the home, their “active” participation in the sale process, and their failure
to object to the sale order.112
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) provides that a bankruptcy trustee may avoid
any pre-petition transfer of assets by a debtor that was made or incurred
on or within two years before the date of the filing of the petition if the
debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud”
any past or future creditor.113 Although the Code does not explicitly de-
fine “intent to hinder, delay, or defraud,” courts have found that intent to
“hinder and delay” can be found under the statute without intent to de-
fraud.114 Here, according to the trial court and affirmed on appeal, Mr.
Wiggains illustrated actual intent to keep the property in the hands of his
wife, which the Fifth Circuit equated with actual intent to keep it out of
the hands of creditors, and thus, subjected the property to avoidance
under § 548.115
B. CONNIVING CANCELLATION: THE WAIVER OF A 60-DAY
CANCELLATION NOTICE OR PENALTY IS AN ASSET UNDER
TUFTA—HOMETOWN VALLEY VIEW
In Hometown 2006-1 1925 Valley View, L.L.C. v. Prime Income Asset
Management, L.L.C.,116 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that contractual payments due during a required sixty-day termina-
tion notice period are an asset under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (TUFTA).117 The mutual waiver of a contract’s termination
provision, in an effort to benefit an alter ego and escape payment of dam-
ages, is a fraudulent transfer subject to clawback by a trustee.118
Prime Income Asset Management, L.L.C. (Prime LLC) was contracted
to operate as an advisor to three publicly traded real estate companies.119
Prime LLC was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Prime Income Manage-
ment, Inc. (Prime Inc.). Prime Inc. provided all of the services for these
contracts on behalf of Prime LLC because Prime LLC had no employees
or assets. All three advisory contracts (the Advisory Contracts) for the
111. In re Wiggains, 848 F.3d at 667.
112. Id. at 668.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (West 2005).
114. Id.
115. In re Wiggains, 848 F.3d at 622–23. The attorney for Wiggains has filed a petition
for an en banc rehearing, and the Fifth Circuit ordered Reed to respond. The parties are
waiting to hear from the Fifth Circuit, which has not yet ruled on the petition.
116. 847 F.3d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 2017).
117. Id. at 304; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002 (West 2015).
118. Hometown, 847 F.3d at 304–05, 308.
119. American Realty Investors, Inc.; Transcontinental Realty Investors, Inc.; and In-
come Opportunity Realty Investors, Inc.
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publicly traded real estate companies had a provision that required sixty-
day written notice to Prime LLC for cancellation, and failure to provide
notice subjected them to an early cancellation penalty.120
Independent of the Advisory Contracts, Prime LLC was guarantor on a
commercial real estate loan. Hometown 2006-1 1925 Valley View, L.L.C.
(Hometown), the plaintiff in the case, was successor-in-interest to this
loan. The borrower on the loan had missed payments and demolished
part of the property without authorization, so Hometown responsively
moved to foreclose on the property. Before foreclosure, Prime LLC
transferred its interest in the property to an affiliated company, EQK
Bridgeview Plaza, Inc. (EQK), who after the transfer and still before
foreclosure, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.121
The automatic stay went into effect upon EQK’s filing and Hometown
could not continue its foreclosure on the property. Hometown petitioned
the bankruptcy court to lift the stay to allow the foreclosure to proceed—
such relief was granted. Hometown also sued Prime LLC in their capacity
as guarantor, ultimately obtaining a judgment for the foreclosure defi-
ciency (over $2 million).
Shortly after Hometown obtained the judgment, Prime LLC and its
members in their entirety created a new company called Pillar Income
Asset Management, Inc. (Pillar). The three real estate companies who
were party to the Advisory Contracts immediately terminated the con-
tracts. Prime LLC did not require sixty-day notice as stipulated nor did it
issue any sort of penalty per the terms of the Advisory Contracts. The
three real estate companies then entered into new contracts (the New
Advisory Contracts) with Pillar on nearly identical terms as they did with
Prime LLC.122
In an effort to distance itself, Pillar filed a declaratory judgment in Ne-
vada state court seeking a declaration that it was not an alter ego of
Prime LLC. Hometown removed the suit to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nevada. Afterward, “[a]sserting that it was unable to col-
lect on its judgment, Hometown filed the instant action against Prime
LLC as well as . . . Prime Inc. . . . [and] Pillar . . . asserting claims for
fraudulent transfer under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
. . . .”123 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas re-
moved the case to Nevada under the first-filed doctrine, and the District
of Nevada then returned the case to Texas. Once in the Northern District
of Texas, the district court dismissed Hometown’s complaint, holding that
the Advisory Contracts were not assets under TUFTA.124 Hometown ap-
pealed to the Fifth Circuit.125
120. Hometown, 847 F.3d at 304–05.
121. Id. at 305.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 305–06.
124. Id. at 306.
125. Id.
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On appeal, Hometown argued that the Advisory Contracts and the
subsequent New Advisory Contracts were fraudulent transfers of assets
under Texas law and that the district court erred in dismissing its claim
under Rule 12(b)(6).126
The Fifth Circuit first delved into how broadly definitions are con-
strued under TUFTA, hinting at how encompassing TUFTA can be.127
Under TUFTA, “asset” is defined as “property of a debtor.”128 “Prop-
erty” is defined as “anything that may be the subject of ownership.”129
The Fifth Circuit next analyzed two cases the district court relied on
when it decided to dismiss Hometown’s claim. The district court used two
bankruptcy cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
as guidance: In re Commodity Merchants, Inc.130 and In re Wey.131
In In re Commodity Merchants, Inc., the contracts were terminated le-
gally according to the terms and done so in good faith. The Seventh Cir-
cuit held that “the contracts were not freely assignable and had no
market value in light of the termination provisions, so that their cancella-
tion could not sustain a claim of fraudulent transfer.”132 In In re Wey, the
Seventh Circuit held that “[w]hen a termination is pursuant to the terms
of a contract, there is no transfer.”133
Similar to the Seventh Circuit cases, the contracts at issue in this case
“were not freely terminable.”134 Because they were not freely terminable,
Hometown argued that by waiving the termination provision, Prime LLC
created an asset in the funds that would have otherwise been transferred
either by penalty or during the sixty-day notice period. Prime LLC con-
versely argued that because those services had not yet been completed,
the future compensation Hometown would have acquired had not yet
vested.135
The Fifth Circuit opined that Prime LLC was misreading its own termi-
nation provision as a “superfluity.”136 There was a minimum base pay
paid on the fifteenth of every month under the contracts regardless of
services provided. “Waiver of the sixty-day notice period effected a trans-
fer of the right to continue performance under the Agreements and re-
ceive the payments due thereunder, payments which had ascertainable
value and were sufficiently vested [as] ‘assets’ under TUFTA’s broad def-
inition of ‘anything that may be the subject of ownership.’”137
126. Id. at 306–07. Prime LLC and the other defendants also claimed that the Northern
District of Texas lacked diversity jurisdiction. The court disagreed. Since this issue does not
specifically relate to bankruptcy, it is not analyzed in this Survey.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 307 (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002 (West 2015)).
129. Id.
130. 538 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1976).
131. 854 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1988).
132. Hometown, 847 F.3d at 307–08.




137. Id. at 308–09.
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In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit held that the value of the Advisory
Contracts stemmed from the minimum payments they would have gener-
ated during the sixty-day notice period.138 It was this value that allowed
the cancellation of the Advisory Contracts to be characterized as an asset
under TUFTA.139
It is now affirmed that “asset” under TUFTA entails potential sums
from wrongly terminated contracts. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the TUFTA claims and remanded for
further proceedings.140 By declaring cancellation of the Advisory Con-
tracts not on stipulated terms an asset, Hometown made a cognizable
claim of constructive transfer that withstood Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny.141
It is well known that definitions under TUFTA are broad. This con-
struction ensures protection for victims of fraudulent transfers.
Hometown, on remand, has the potential to claw back estate property if
it can carry the burden to show a constructive transfer did take place
under TUFTA. The breadth of these definitions allow trustees, parties in
interest, or courts to have the latitude to weed through questionable an-
tics and, ultimately, protect the bankruptcy system.
C. TIMING IS EVERYTHING: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DISSECTS WHAT IS
ACTUALLY MEANT BY “TRANSFER” IN IN RE JACKSON
In In re Jackson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that a debtor does not have a property right that a creditor can
garnish or a debtor can transfer until wages are actually earned.142 Conse-
quently, the Fifth Circuit held that a creditor’s interest in wages under a
garnishment order does not begin at the time of service of the order to a
debtor’s employer, but instead, only begins when a debtor first acquires
the right to be paid.143 Despite a garnishment order being served outside
the ninety-day preference window, wages subject to a garnishment order
that are earned during the ninety-day preference period can be voided
under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.144
Tower Credit, Inc. (Tower Credit), obtained a garnishment order
against Mr. Jackson (Debtor) for a money judgment in Louisiana state
court. The order was effective on January 19, 2012, when Tower Credit
served Debtor’s employer. Between January 19 and November 17, the
Debtor’s paychecks were garnished without any problems. On November
17, 2012, the Debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.145
The trustee in the Debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy case initiated an ad-
versary action against Tower Credit. The action sought to void the gar-
138. Id.
139. Id. at 309.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Tower Credit, Inc. v. Schott (In re Jackson), 850 F.3d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 2017).
143. Id. at 820.
144. Id. at 817–18; 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (West 2016).
145. In re Jackson, 850 F.3d at 817.
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nishments collected by Tower Credit prior to November 17, stating they
were preferential transfers under § 547(b)(4)(A) because they were made
within the ninety-day clawback window contemplated by the statute.
Tower Credit objected, arguing that the interest in the wages was trans-
ferred when Tower Credit served the Debtor’s employer on January 19,
so the transfer was effectively outside of the ninety-day preference
period.146
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
granted summary judgement for the trustee. The district court affirmed
and Tower Credit appealed to the Fifth Circuit.147 On appeal, Tower
Credit argued that the future payments owed to it under the garnishment
order were transferred at the time the garnishment order was served on
the Debtor’s employer—January 19—and could not be voided under
§ 547(b) because such date existed outside the ninety-day preference pe-
riod.148 The Fifth Circuit was left to dissect the technicalities of what con-
stitutes a transfer.
In Barnhill v. Johnson,149 the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[w]hat
constitutes a transfer and when it is complete is a matter of federal
law.”150 State law only controls in the absence of federal law. Federal law
exists and, therefore, the Fifth Circuit determined that § 547(e) controls if
and when the interest in the Debtor’s wages was transferred to Tower
Credit.151
The Fifth Circuit then dove into § 547(e), which says a transfer is gen-
erally made at the time it is “perfected.”152 Section 547(e)(3) goes on to
state that “a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in
the property transferred.”153
The Fifth Circuit held that Tower Credit was technically right in con-
testing that its interest was “perfected” because, upon serving the gar-
nishment order, no party could acquire a judicial lien superior to Tower
Credit’s interest.154 However, Tower Credit missed the big picture by
neglecting the language of § 547(e)(3) that requires a debtor to have
rights in the property to effectuate a transfer.155
Citing authority from the U.S. Supreme Court and an interpretation of
that authority in a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit held that “a debtor cannot logically obtain rights
146. Id. at 818.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 503 U.S. 393 (1992).
150. In re Jackson, 850 F.3d at 818 (quoting id. at 397).
151. Id.
152. Id. “[A] transfer is generally made at the time it is ‘perfected,’ which, in the con-
text of non-real property, occurs when ‘a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a
judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee.’” Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§§ 547(e)(2)(B), 547(e)(1)(B) (West 2016)).
153. Id. at 819 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3)).
154. Id. at 818–19.
155. Id. at 819.
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in her future wages until she performs the services that entitle her to re-
ceive those wages.”156 Here, even though the Debtor was subjected to a
wage garnishment order put in place prior to the preference period, he
had no right to transfer future wages subject to that order until they were
earned. Therefore, since the Debtor had not yet “brought [the] earnings
into existence,” no property rights existed at the time the garnishment
order was served on the Debtor’s employer.157 And because no property
rights existed yet, a transfer of interest could not be effectuated on Janu-
ary 19.158
The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that Tower Credit only acquired the
interest in the Debtor’s wages when he earned them, and $1,756.04 of
those wages were earned in the ninety-day period preceding bank-
ruptcy.159 Because the interest in those wages was obtained in the ninety-
day preference period and all other elements of § 547(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code were met, the trustee could void the garnishment of
$1,756.04 as preferential transfers pursuant to § 547(b).160
Though the holding seems narrow at first, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling en-
compasses the broader question of what constitutes a transfer. First, the
decision emphasizes that federal law, when present and controlling, al-
ways dictates what constitutes a transfer. Though transfers deal with
property interests—and property issues traditionally get resolved under
state law—the Fifth Circuit has maintained authority to apply federal
statutes to issues not just with preferential transfers, but generally to all
transfers in the bankruptcy context. Given that bankruptcy courts and
bankruptcy practitioners often find themselves dealing with state law
property issues, it is assuring to know that the Bankruptcy Code is bind-
ing authority on the issue of transfers.
Moreover, in parsing out the language of § 547, the Fifth Circuit has
declared when a property interest vests. Section 547’s general principle—
that “a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the
property transferred”—has broad implications. Tower Credit cited a trio
of cases that supported the proposition that transfer of garnished wages
occur at the time the garnishment is served on an employer. In ultimately
holding the opposite, the Fifth Circuit cited to separate authority, includ-
ing the Supreme Court and Collier on Bankruptcy, that wages cannot be
garnished until the debtor first acquires the right to be paid.161 In follow-
ing these authorities, the Fifth Circuit has solidified that a transfer cannot
be effectuated until such person acquires the right to that property. It
seems intuitive, but in the bankruptcy context, timing is often everything.
156. Id. (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 243 (1934)); see Morehead v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (In re Morehead), 249 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2001).
157. In re Jackson, 850 F.3d at 820.
158. Id. at 821.
159. Id. at 818.
160. Id. at 819–21.
161. Id.
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It will be interesting to see if Jackson is used for its broader holding. In
the meantime, Jackson affirms that a transfer can only be effectuated
when a debtor first acquires rights in the property, and if such transfer
occurs within the ninety days prior to bankruptcy, it will be subject to
preferential transfer actions under § 547. Texas bankruptcy lawyers sel-
dom deal with wage garnishments because wages are generally exempt
personal property in Texas.162 The authors thought this case noteworthy
because of the rich discussion of transfers.
V. DISCHARGE
A. COLLECTIVE GUILT AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: FIFTH CIRCUIT
IMPARTS INTENT ONTO CO-CONSPIRATOR IN NON-
DISCHARGEABILITY ACTION AND ELABORATES
ON A COURT’S ABILITY TO VIOLATE THE
AUTOMATIC STAY—IN RE COWIN
In In re Cowin,163 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that damages from a debtor’s involvement in a larceny scheme is a non-
dischargeable debt under § 523(a)(4).164 The intent and conduct of a
debtor’s co-conspirators can be imparted onto the debtor for purposes of
non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(4). The Fifth Circuit also held that,
where both parties agreed to continue adversary proceedings upon dis-
missal of the underlying bankruptcy case, a bankruptcy court’s entry of a
final judgement against a debtor from the previously dismissed bank-
ruptcy case does not violate the automatic stay of a new Chapter 7 pro-
ceeding because of harmless error.165
Charles Cowin (Cowin), along with a number of family members and
friends, executed an elaborate larceny scheme that deprived mortgage
owners of excess foreclosure sale proceeds. This deception was accom-
plished through manipulation of the Texas Tax Code and Texas property
laws. “Under Texas law, after a foreclosure sale, tax-transfer liens take
priority, junior liens are extinguished, and any excess funds are paid to
the junior lienholders in seniority order.”166 The scheme worked as fol-
lows: (1) a purchaser would buy a foreclosed property with a first-lien
mortgage; (2) the purchaser would enter into a tax-transfer loan agree-
ment with one of Cowin’s companies to cover the property taxes; (3) the
purchaser would default on the tax loan; (4) Cowin, through his company,
would order the trustee of the tax-transfer deed to foreclose on the prop-
erty for failure to pay the loan; and (5) without telling the trustee about
the previous mortgage holder, Cowin would auction off the home to pay
the tax loan, take his fee of $1,000, and return any excess proceeds to the
162. TEX. PROP. CODE § 42.001(b)(1).
163. 864 F.3d 344, 349–50 (5th Cir. 2017).
164. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(4) reads: “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (West 2016).
165. In re Cowin, 864 F.3d at 353.
166. Id. at 347; see TEX. TAX. CODE §§ 32.06(b), (j) (West 2013).
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purchaser, thus skipping over the junior lienholder.167
In early 2010, Bank of America, N.A. (BOA), filed suit against Cowin
and his co-conspirators for the excess funds and other damages resulting
from the scheme. Cowin subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
the middle of litigation—that bankruptcy case was dismissed. In May of
2010, Cowin then again filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In November,
while in that Chapter 11, Countrywide Home Loans Inc. (Countrywide),
Deutsche Bank, and several other banks, brought a non-dischargeability
action against Cowin (the Countrywide Adversary Proceeding). The U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
dismissed the second Chapter 11 case in January of 2012 after finding that
Cowin had “abused the [bankruptcy] process by filing two Chapter 11
petitions within the last two years [without filing] a plan and disclosure
statement.”168 However, the bankruptcy court, at the parties’ request, re-
tained the Countrywide Adversary Proceeding to obtain a final adjudica-
tion on the issue of non-dischargeability.169
Separate from the Countrywide Adversary Proceeding, BOA’s litiga-
tion continued. In January 2013, BOA and Cowin entered into a settle-
ment agreement (the BOA Settlement Agreement) while Cowin was not
in bankruptcy. Under this agreement, if Cowin entered into bankruptcy
again, BOA would be able to immediately seek relief from the automatic
stay.170
Remember, the bankruptcy court from the second Chapter 11 retained
jurisdiction over the Countrywide Adversary Proceeding. Right before
the ruling in the Countrywide Adversary Proceeding was made, Cowin
filed for his third bankruptcy, this time Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court,
the same court that retained his adversary proceeding, lifted the auto-
matic stay from the Chapter 7 to enter the BOA Settlement Agreement.
The bankruptcy court did not do the same for Countrywide, and it instead
entered a final judgment against Cowin that held the Countrywide debt
non-dischargeable.171
BOA filed an adversary proceeding in Cowin’s new Chapter 7 case.
BOA sought to have the debt labelled as non-dischargeable. The bank-
ruptcy court found that the BOA debt was non-dischargeable.172
Cowin appealed the Countrywide Adversary Proceeding judgment to
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. After the dis-
trict court affirmed on September 29, 2015, Cowin appealed the case to
the Fifth Circuit. Cowin then appealed the BOA decision directly to the
Fifth Circuit. Both the appeals were consolidated.173
167. In re Cowin, 864 F.3d at 347.







Cowin’s argument on appeal had two components. First, he argued that
the debt to Countrywide was dischargeable. Second, he argued that the
bankruptcy court violated the automatic stay in his Chapter 7 case by
entering the Countrywide Adversary Judgment.174
The Fifth Circuit resolved the issue of non-dischargeability by holding
that the factual findings of the case did show “Cowin’s individual intent
and conduct” warranted non-dischargeability under §§ 523(a)(4) and
523(a)(6).175 The Fifth Circuit entertained Cowin’s argument that the in-
tent and actions of others cannot be used to satisfy the elements of
§ 523(a)(4), but ultimately held that the actions and intent of co-conspira-
tors in fact can.176
The Fifth Circuit came to this holding by relying on instructive case
law.177 In In Re M.M. Winkler & Assocs.,178 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the actions and intent of other members in
a partnership are enough to satisfy the elements of non-dischargeability
for an individual partner under § 523(a)(2)(A).179 Using the plain mean-
ing of the statute, the Fifth Circuit found that that there were no addi-
tional qualifications to this section.180 The section does not explicitly limit
dischargeability to the individual actions of a debtor, but instead speaks
more generally about how the debt was incurred. The same rationale—
plain meaning—was applied to § 523(a)(4) in Cowin’s case: “a debtor
cannot discharge a debt that arises from larceny so long as the debtor is
liable to the creditor for the larceny.”181 Even based on the actions and
intent of his co-conspirators, Cowin was still liable for the larceny and the
resulting debt was therefore non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(4).182
For the issue of the automatic stay, the Fifth Circuit again looked to
instructive precedent for guidance. In Campbell v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc.,183 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
there was one exception to the automatic stay preventing action against a
debtor—“an automatic stay has no effect on actions that are expressly
allowed under the Bankruptcy Code.”184 The ruling in Campbell was ex-
tremely narrow and only pertained to creditors filing proofs of claims, so
the Fifth Circuit did not feel comfortable applying it more broadly to this
case.185
174. Id.
175. Id. at 350.
176. Id. at 349–50.
177. Id. at 350.
178. 239 F.3d 746, 752 (5th Cir. 2001).
179. In re Cowin, 864 F.3d at 350; see 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(2)(A) (West 2016) (“for
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent
obtained by. . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a state-
ment respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.”).
180. In re Cowin, 864 F.3d at 351.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 545 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2008).
184. Id.
185. In re Cowin, 864 F.3d at 352.
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The Fifth Circuit instead looked at the harmless error doctrine to, in
effect, reach the same result. The Fifth Circuit essentially applied the nar-
row holding of Campbell without explicitly expanding its previous ruling
by holding that, “even assuming error in entering the Countrywide Ad-
versary Proceeding because of the automatic stay, such error would be
harmless.”186 The Fifth Circuit found that a violation of the automatic
stay was harmless for three specific reasons: (1) the bankruptcy court
could have lifted the automatic stay unilaterally at any time; (2) if the
automatic stay was lifted then the outcome would be the exact same; and
(3) Cowin was not prejudiced by the failure to lift the automatic stay
since he was a willing participant in the adversary proceeding.187 The
Fifth Circuit found that the filing of a Chapter 7 proceeding by Cowin was
a last-ditch effort to avoid the unfavorable ruling in the Countrywide Ad-
versary Proceeding.188 A halt on that judgment would only have resulted
in re-litigation of the same issue, and such litigation would further, and
unnecessarily, deplete estate resources.189 Based on these harmless error
principles, the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court did not violate
the automatic stay by entering a judgment against Cowin.190
This case broadens the scope of non-dischargeable debts under
§ 523(a)(4). Using guidance from previous cases, the Fifth Circuit seems
to have expanded what can be used to satisfy the elements of non-dis-
chargeability. On one hand, it is reassuring to know that a debtor, who
would otherwise be able to avoid penalties or damages, can no longer use
the system as a loophole by disclaiming personal wrongdoing. On the
other hand, there is some fear that this could unintentionally expand onto
the hypothetical innocent partner or unknowing individual who believes
his only way to move forward from an unfortunate situation is to dis-
charge the debt in bankruptcy.
Further, the harmless error test established by the Fifth Circuit seems
to be an extremely easy test to satisfy. By essentially expanding Camp-
bell, any action authorized by the Bankruptcy Code cannot violate the
automatic stay. It does not seem to be much of a test at all, as the scope of
actions that could be taken by a court in the name of the Bankruptcy
Code appears broad. Perhaps, however, that was the intention, especially
when the test is applicable in situations geared towards preventing “du-
plicitous litigation” and abuse of the bankruptcy system.191
This case added to the litany of Fifth Circuit cases that find non-dis-
chargeability in situations where the debtor is not the central actor.
186. Id. at 352–53.
187. Id. at 353–54.
188. Id.




B. THE EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: A FIFTH CIRCUIT
CLARIFICATION ON WHAT ACTIONS SATISFY NON-
DISCHARGEABILITY—IN RE HALER
In In re Haler,192 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit elabo-
rated on an exception to an exception, holding a fraudulent debt, typi-
cally non-dischargeable, was nevertheless dischargeable under the
exception of § 523(a)(2).193 The debt was incurred as a result of an oral
general representation of the debtor’s financial condition and, therefore,
the debt was subject to dischargeability.194
In 2006, Randall Haler (Haler) was the Executive Vice President and
limited partner at McKinney Aerospace, L.P. (McKinney). McKinney en-
tered into multiple contracts with Boyington Capital Group, L.L.C. (Boy-
ington) to repair and refurbish its business jet. Boyington initially paid
McKinney $337,275, but contributed another $60,000 after the two com-
panies agreed to a change order. On the same day of the change order
agreement, Boyington cancelled the contract and requested all unused
funds to be returned. McKinney acknowledged it needed to return the
excess funds but the company never did.195
Boyington sued Haler and McKinney in Texas state court for fraud in
July of 2006.196 At the trial, Boyington’s witness stated “that Haler had
expressed to Boyington that McKinney was in ‘very fine legally [sic] fi-
nancial shape’ and had ‘plenty of cash to operate [the] business during
the term that [it was] working on’ the jet.”197 The jury found Haler liable
for fraud and awarded Boyington $258,021.73 in damages. The state court
issued the final judgment on December 6, 2011.198
After the entry of the jury verdict but before the final judgment was
issued, in June of 2010, Haler filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In Septem-
ber of 2010, Boyington initiated an adversary proceeding to get the recent
jury award declared as non-dischargeable debt under §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(4),
and (a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Boyington, after final judgment was
rendered and the appeal process exhausted, sought summary judgement
based on collateral estoppel stemming from the finding of fraud by the
state court. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
Sherman Division found in favor of Boyington and ruled that the debt
was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).199 The district court af-
firmed the summary judgment.200
192. 708 F. App’x 836, 838 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
193. Id. at 841; 11 U.S.C.S. § 523 (West 2016).
194. In re Haler, 708 F. App’x at 839.
195. Id. at 838.
196. Shortly after being sued, McKinney closed and began a self-directed liquidation.
Id.
197. Id. at 838.
198. Id. Haler did appeal the verdict, but the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed with a
minor modification to attorney’s fees. The state court issued an amended, non-appealable
judgement in June of 2015.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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On appeal, Haler argued that the bankruptcy and district courts erred
in their application of § 523(a)(2)(A) to the debt because his statements
“were [oral] ‘statement[s] respecting . . . financial condition’ under
§ 523(a)(2)(A) and thus dischargeable under this subsection.”201
The Fifth Circuit analyzed §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B)(i)–(iv). The
Fifth Circuit held that these sections “generally render debt obtained by
false pretenses, false representations, or actual fraud non-dischargea-
ble.”202 However, the Bankruptcy Code contains an exception: “if the
debt is obtained by a false oral statement respecting financial condition,
then it is dischargeable.”203
At the outset, the Fifth Circuit noted that the statements were made
orally. To further qualify the statements as an exception to an exception,
the Fifth Circuit went into what “statement respecting . . . financial condi-
tion” entails and if Haler’s statements qualified as such. The Fifth Circuit
looked at past precedent in In re Bandi,204 which held that “statements
respecting financial condition are ‘those that purport to present a picture
of the debtor’s overall financial health.’”205 The overall financial health
of a company is a general representation and it need not be a report or
reflection of a specific asset.206 Haler never made any false claims about
specific assets but instead gave a general representation about McKinney
to Boyington, which purported to fall under the applicable definition. The
Fifth Circuit differentiated between this case and In re Bandi. In that
case, the debtor made false statements about real property that the
debtor did not actually own—false statement toward specific assets that
did not constitute statements respecting financial condition.207 Here, the
oral statements were general in nature and did constitute statements re-
specting financial condition.208
The Fifth Circuit further emphasized that the statements of financial
condition need not be formal, such as a presentation of the balance sheet
or other financial statements. “The information regarding ‘overall net
worth or overall income flow’ contained within such a statement—not the
formality of the statement—is what is important.”209
In light of this reasoning, the Fifth Circuit found Haler’s debt to be
dischargeable.210 One, the statements were oral.211 Two, they were gen-
eral in nature and met the definition of “statement respecting . . . finan-
cial condition.”212 Haler’s statements therefore fit within the exception
201. Id.
202. Id. at 839–40.
203. Id.
204. 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012).
205. In re Haler, 708 F. App’x at 840 (quoting id. at 677).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 840–41.
209. Id. at 841 (quoting In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 677 n.29).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 840.
212. Id. at 840–41.
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outlined in § 523(a)(2)(A).213
This will be an interesting one to keep an eye on. The U.S. Supreme
Court has recently granted certiorari in Lamar Archer & Cofrin LLP v.
Appling, an U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit case dealing
with the meaning of “respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” in
the context of non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B).214 The
Eleventh Circuit recognized the circuit split on the issue; it rejected the
Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit’s holdings that deem a statement con-
cerning a single asset to not be a statement concerning the debtor’s finan-
cial condition, and instead, held that a statement concerning a single asset
may qualify as a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition—
making such statement outside the purview of non-dischargeability
actions.
The Fifth Circuit’s reaffirmation of the exception in § 523(a)(2)(A),
and its insight into the scope of the exception, still holds until the Su-
preme Court chimes in. The Fifth Circuit has certified the need for the
statements to be oral—the exception does not extend to statements in
writing. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit solidified the general nature of
“statement[s] respecting . . . financial condition.”215 So as it stands, gen-
eral oral statements are the only type afforded the exception to the ex-
ception, and oral statements concerning a single asset—because they do
not qualify as statements respecting the debtor’s financial condition—are
still subject to non-dischargeability under § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code.
It is also interesting to note the procedural posture of this case. Haler
was found guilty of fraud in state court, yet this same fraud was dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy. Res judicata effect as to state court judgments
carries weight in bankruptcy court, but these judgments must be viewed
in the light of the applicable standard under the Bankruptcy Code and its
provisions. While Haler’s actions constituted fraud in state court, it did
not amount to such a gross degree in bankruptcy court to render that
debt non-dischargeable.
VI. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
A. PROOFS OF CLAIM ON A TIME-BARRED DEBT PERMITTED UNDER
THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT—MIDLAND
FUNDING, LLC V. JOHNSON
On May 15, 2017, in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson,216 the U.S.
Supreme Court settled a contentious circuit split on whether filing a proof
of claim on a time-barred debt in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).217 The FDCPA provisions
213. Id. at 841.
214. Lamar Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 958, 960 (11th Cir. 2017)
cert. granted sub nom. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 734 (2018).
215. In re Haler, 708 F. App’x at 839.
216. 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a–1692p (West 1977).
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at issue prohibit debt collectors from making representations or using
means that are “false,” “deceptive,” “misleading,” “unfair,” or “uncon-
scionable.”218 The majority opinion, penned by Justice Breyer, found the
conduct to be permissible, although it was met by a scathing dissent.
In this case, the debt collector filed a proof of claim in the debtor’s
Chapter 13 bankruptcy that appeared on its face to be barred by the ap-
plicable statute of limitations.219 The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division disallowed the claim
following the debtor’s objection, but the debtor filed suit against the debt
collector for violating the FDCPA. The U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of Alabama, Southern Division dismissed the action, but the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, reaffirming its
prior decision finding the debt collector’s conduct to be prohibited.220
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Eleventh Circuit.
The Supreme Court began its analysis on the “reasonably clear” ques-
tion of whether filing a proof of claim for a time-barred debt was a “false,
deceptive, or misleading” representation under § 1692e.221 To put it sim-
ply, the Supreme Court found no violation because a time-barred debt
was nevertheless a “claim” for bankruptcy purposes. While the Bank-
ruptcy Code (the Code) defines “claim” as a “right to payment,”222 state
law tells us whether a right to payment exists after the expiration of a
statute of limitations. In Alabama (the relevant state law in this case),
like most states, the right to payment survives the expiration of the stat-
ute of limitations.223 Because the time-barred debt remained a right to
payment under state law, it was not false, deceptive, or misleading to as-
sert it as a claim in bankruptcy.224
The debtor, along with the United States as amicus curiae, argued that
the Code’s definition of “claim” really means an “enforceable claim.”225
The Supreme Court found this argument unpersuasive because the claims
allowance provisions of the Code specifically provide that an unenforce-
able claim should be disallowed upon objection.226 Importantly, the Su-
preme Court noted “[the Code] does not say that an ‘unenforceable’
claim is not a ‘claim.’”227 The Supreme Court went on to explain that
“[t]he law has long treated unenforceability of a claim (due to the expira-
218. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e (West 1996), 1692f (West 1977).
219. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. at 1411. The date of the last charge on the account was more
than ten years before the bankruptcy was filed, and the applicable Alabama statute of
limitations was six years. Id.
220. Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2016) (reaffirm-
ing Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014)).
221. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. at 1411.
222. 11. U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (West 2012).
223. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. at 1411. The Supreme Court noted that in Mississippi and Wis-
consin, the expiration of the limitations period extinguishes both the remedy and the right,
suggesting a different outcome in those jurisdictions. Id. at 1412.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (West 2005)).
227. Id.
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tion of the limitations period) as an affirmative defense,” which the
debtor must raise after a claim is asserted, and there is “nothing mislead-
ing or deceptive in the filing of a proof of claim that, in effect, follows [a]
similar system.”228
As a final thought on whether a statement is misleading under § 1692e,
the Supreme Court said that consideration must be made as to the “legal
sophistication of [the statement’s] audience.”229 In a Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy, the audience includes a trustee with a statutory duty to object to
improper claims.230 While a sophisticated trustee is not likely to be misled
by a proof of claim for a time-barred debt, the Supreme Court, in a par-
enthetical, said it would not address the appropriate standard in ordinary
litigation.231
The Supreme Court then addressed the “closer question” of whether
filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt constituted “unfair or uncon-
scionable” means of collection under § 1692f.232 The debtor relied on
strong precedent that found an FDCPA violation for filing a civil lawsuit
on time-barred debt.233 The primary concerns underlying civil suits on
time-barred debt include that the debtor may acquiesce and unwittingly
pay the stale debt; that few consumer debtors would be aware that timeli-
ness is an affirmative defense; that the debtor may forget details or lose
documentation; or that the debtor may pay the debt merely to avoid
court.234 The Supreme Court remained unmoved by this precedent, how-
ever, opining that these concerns “have significantly diminished force in
the context of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.”235
The Supreme Court made two counterpoints in response to this ex-
isting precedent. First, unlike a civil suit on debt, the debtor in a Chapter
13 bankruptcy initiates the proceeding, alleviating the concern that a
debtor may pay the stale debt to avoid court.236 The Supreme Court’s
second counterpoint reiterated the role of the trustee in a Chapter 13
bankruptcy as a gatekeeper of claims, “mak[ing] it considerably more
likely that an effort to collect upon a stale claim in bankruptcy will be met
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1413 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 n.37 (1977)).
230. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5) (West 2010), 1302(b)(1) (West 2010)).
231. Id. In ordinary FDCPA litigation, the “least sophisticated consumer” standard is
almost universally applied, which asks whether an unsophisticated consumer would be mis-
led by the statement at issue. See Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th
Cir. 1985) (“[T]he FDCPA’s purpose of protecting consumers is best served by a definition
of ‘deceive’ that looks to the tendency of language to mislead the least sophisticated recipi-
ents of a debt collector’s [communication] . . . .”); see also Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791
F.3d 413, 420 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Courts of Appeals have nearly universally embraced
Jeter’s reasoning and employed the least sophisticated debtor standard . . . .”).
232. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. at 1413.
233. Id. (citing, among other cases, Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076,
1079 (7th Cir. 2013); Castro v. Collecto, Inc., 634 F.3d 779, 783 (5th Cir. 2011); Kimber v.
Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (M.D. Ala. 1987)).
234. Id. at 1413.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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with resistance, objection, and disallowance.”237
The Supreme Court wrapped up its analysis by comparing the purposes
and structural features of the FDCPA and the Code, finding that applying
the FDCPA to this context would disturb the “delicate balance of a
debtor’s protections and obligations” created by the Code.238 For one, it
would create a substantive bankruptcy-related remedy the Code itself did
not provide.239 Second, it would permit litigation in ordinary civil courts
concerning bankruptcy-related questions.240 And finally, it would force
debt collectors to analyze the merits of a limitations defense when the
Advisory Committee on Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure had considered
and rejected precisely such a requirement.241
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion prompted an even longer dis-
sent from Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan. Be-
cause the dissent found the conduct at issue to be “unfair or
unconscionable” under § 1692f, it did not consider whether the conduct
was also “false, deceptive, or misleading” under § 1692e.242
The dissent emphasized the sheer magnitude of the debt collection in-
dustry (“hundreds of billions of dollars”) and how debt collectors have
recently turned to the bankruptcy forum to collect time-barred debts af-
ter receiving FDCPA violations for pursuing recovery through traditional
civil litigation.243 Justice Sotomayor noted that the problem of filing time-
barred claims in bankruptcy “has become so widespread that the Govern-
ment sued one debt buyer last year ‘to address [its] systemic abuse of the
bankruptcy process’—including a ‘business model’ of ‘knowingly and
strategically’ filing thousands of claims for time-barred debt.”244
The dissent then took issue with the majority’s failure to apply to the
bankruptcy context the existing FDCPA precedent prohibiting civil suits
on stale debt.245 The dissent found that “[t]he same dynamics are present
in bankruptcy proceedings” that exist in the proceedings of civil law-
suits.246 While the majority heavily relied on the existence and protection
of a trustee in bankruptcy, the United States government, as amicus cu-
riae (and the entity that oversees Chapter 13 trustees), argued that “trust-
ees ‘cannot realistically be expected to identify every time-barred . . .
claim filed in every bankruptcy.’”247 The dissent also pointed out that
“[t]he trustees themselves (appearing here as amici curiae) agree, describ-
ing the practice as ‘wasteful’ and ‘exploit[ative].’”248
237. Id. at 1414.




242. Id. at 1416 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 1416–17.
244. Id. at 1418 (internal citations omitted).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1419.
247. Id. at 1420.
248. Id.
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In a final adornment, the dissent added that “one should not be able to
profit on the inadvertent inattention of others. It is said that the law
should not be a trap for the unwary. Today’s decision sets just such a
trap.”249
B. FOLLOW-UP TO MIDLAND FUNDING: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
HENSON V. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.
Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson was decided 5–3 without input from
newly confirmed Justice Gorsuch. However, as his first task on the high
court, Justice Gorsuch wrote the unanimous opinion in Henson v. Santan-
der Consumer USA Inc.,250 which, although it is not a bankruptcy case,
could have a significant impact on the FDCPA and time-barred debt col-
lection in and out of bankruptcy.
In Henson, CitiFinancial Auto made an auto loan that subsequently
defaulted.251 Santander purchased the defaulted loan and attempted to
collect. The borrowers sued under the FDCPA for conduct related to that
collection. The issue was rather simple: whether Santander fell within the
FDCPA’s definition of a debt collector as an entity that “regularly col-
lects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due . . . another.”252 In other
words, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether the FDCPA ap-
plied to debt buyers collecting on their own purchased accounts. The
unanimous Supreme Court gave a resounding “no.” In an impressive dis-
play of wit flowing from a study of the proper usage of the past participle
“owed,” the grammarian Supreme Court held that debt purchasers do not
trigger the FDCPA’s definition at issue.253
Henson’s holding could prove significant because, just like Santander,
in Johnson, the debt collector was actually a debt buyer collecting on its
own account.254 Justice Sotomayor mentioned the pending Henson case
in her dissent in Johnson, noting that Midland did not dispute that it was
a debt collector subject to the FDCPA.255 Had Henson been decided
before Johnson, there may have been no Johnson.
249. Id. at 1421.
250. 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1720 (2017) (per curiam).
251. Id. at 1720.
252. Id. at 1721 (citing the second part of the statutory definition of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6) (West 2011)). It is important to note that the Court limited its analysis to this
particular part of the statutory definition. Because the debtor did not make the argument,
it did not address the first part of § 1692a(6)’s definition of “debt collector,” which includes
an entity whose “principal purpose . . . is the collection of any debts.” Id.
253. Id. at 1721–22. For an interesting “plain meaning” analysis of Henson and Johnson
by a leading constitutional law expert, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: The Myth of
‘Plain Meaning’, ABA J. (Oct. 31, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/arti-
cle/chemerinsky_plain_meaning_is_a_myth[https://perma.cc/8Y6U-9KUD].
254. Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Midland
purchases accounts with overdue unpaid balances and tries to collect those accounts.”),
rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017).
255. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 n.2 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
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The Henson decision has potential long-range impact because, as it
stands, not only have debt buyers been given carte blanche to file time-
barred claims in bankruptcy, but there may also be an argument that debt
buyers are not subject to the FDCPA at all. As Justice Sotomayor put it in
Johnson, “the Court’s decision today need not be the last word on the
matter. If Congress wants to amend the FDCPA to make explicit what in
my view is already implicit in the law, it need only say so.”256
C. DEBT COLLECTORS BEWARE: FIFTH CIRCUIT EXPANDS SCOPE OF
POTENTIAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
VIOLATIONS IN DAUGHERTY V. CONVERGENT
OUTSOURCING, INC.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently weighed in on
the growing conflict among the circuit courts regarding the permissibility
of a collection letter offering to “settle” a time-barred debt. In Daugherty
v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that a collection
letter, which is silent as to litigation but offers to “settle” a time-barred
debt without disclosing its unenforceability, may be sufficiently deceptive
or misleading to constitute a violation of the FDCPA.257 In doing so, the
Fifth Circuit agreed with the more debtor-friendly decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and expanded the scope of po-
tential FDCPA violations.
After Roxanne Daugherty (the Debtor) defaulted on an accumulated
$12,824.24 in credit card debt, LVNV Funding, L.L.C. (LVNV) purchased
the debt from the creditor and hired Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. (Con-
vergent) to collect the debt on its behalf. Over the course of several years,
the debt had increased to $32,405.91. In January 2014, after the statute of
limitations on collection of the debt had expired, Convergent sent the
Debtor a letter entitled “Settlement Offer.” The letter proposed that the
Debtor make a payment of $3,240.59—representing ten percent of the
Debtor’s total balance—to “settle” a “past due balance of $32,405.91.”258
The letter requested a response within sixty days and offered three pay-
ment options: (1) a “Lump Sum Settlement Offer of 10%,” which re-
quired a single payment of $3,240.59; (2) a “Settlement Offer of 25% &
Pay Over 3 Months,” which required three payments of $2,700.49; or (3)
“Spread Your Payments Over 12 Months,” which required monthly pay-
ments of $2,700.49 over a year.259
The Debtor filed a lawsuit against Convergent and LVNV, alleging vio-
lations of the FDCPA. Specifically, the Debtor alleged that Convergent
and LVNV—both “debt collectors” under the FDCPA—violated 15
U.S.C. § 1692e by using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in
collecting her debt. In addition, the Debtor alleged that Convergent and
256. Id. at 1421.
257. Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 507 (5th Cir. 2016).
258. Id. at 509.
259. Id. at 510.
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LVNV violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f by using unfair or unconscionable
means in attempting to collect her debt. The Debtor faulted Convergent’s
letter for failing to disclose that the debt was judicially unenforceable and
that partial payment would both trigger tax liability and revive the entire
debt.
Convergent and LVNV moved to dismiss the Debtor’s suit under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas granted the motion, holding that a debt collector is per-
mitted to seek voluntary repayment of a time-barred debt under the
FDCPA so long as there is no threat or initiation of legal action.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit began with the premise that Congress in-
tended the FDCPA to have a “broad remedial scope,” and that the
FDCPA therefore must be construed “broadly and in favor of the con-
sumer.”260 The Fifth Circuit noted a split in the circuits with respect to
whether a collection letter offering “settlement” of a time-barred debt
can violate the FDCPA if the creditor does not expressly threaten litiga-
tion. While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third and Eighth Circuits
have found that such circumstances do not constitute a violation of the
FDCPA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
have ruled that it may constitute a violation if the creditor conveys the
impression that the debt is legally enforceable. After a careful analysis of
the split, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of
the FDCPA as articulated in McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC.261
In McMahon, the debt collectors sent letters that offered to “settle”
certain debts at a substantial discount, but failed to disclose that the stat-
ute of limitations periods had already expired.262 The Seventh Circuit ac-
knowledged that efforts to collect on a time-barred debt are not
“automatically improper,” but noted that offers to “settle” may mislead
an unsophisticated consumer into believing that the debt is judicially en-
forceable.263 The Seventh Circuit highlighted that the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) have previously argued that a debt collector collecting on a time-
barred claim is required to disclose the unenforceability of the debt.264
Because the letters at issue could have misled a consumer into believing
that the claim was judicially enforceable, the Seventh Circuit held that
each plaintiff’s claim should survive the motion to dismiss.265
Similarly, in Buchanan v. Northland Group, Inc., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit considered the impact of a collection letter
offering to “settle” a time-barred claim and concluded that misrepresent-
260. Id.
261. 744 F.3d 1010, 1013–14 (7th Cir. 2014).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1020.
264. Id. at 1021.
265. Id. at 1022.
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ing the legal status of the debt may constitute an FDCPA violation.266 In
reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit emphasized the letter’s danger-
ous potential to lead a debtor to inadvertently revive the entire debt. The
Sixth Circuit reasoned that an unsophisticated consumer who could not
afford the entire settlement might assume that a partial payment on the
balance would be advisable, without realizing that such payment would
restart the statute of limitations on the principal debt.267
Conversely, in Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc., the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a collection letter de-
manding payment on a time-barred debt—but lacking any disclosure
about the legal status of the debt—was permissible under the FDCPA.268
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that “a statute of limitations does not elimi-
nate the debt; it merely limits the judicial remedies available.”269 Shortly
thereafter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed suit
in Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Management, noting that a debt collector may
request voluntary repayment of a time-barred debt so long as the collec-
tion letter does not contain a threat of litigation.270
In Daugherty, the Fifth Circuit noted the “differing perspectives” of-
fered by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits on the extent to which their opin-
ions conflict with Freyermuth and Huertas.271 While the Sixth Circuit
distinguished Freyermuth and Huertas based on the fact that the collec-
tion letters at issue did not offer to “settle” the debt, the Seventh Circuit
explicitly rejected the Third and Eighth Circuit’s reading of the FDCPA,
acknowledging that its “opinion create[d] a conflict in the circuits.”272
In Daugherty, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s interpre-
tation of the FDCPA and held that a collection letter offering to “settle”
a time-barred debt without disclosing its unenforceability or the potential
consequences of partial payment may constitute a violation of the
FDCPA.273 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found that the Debtor’s claim
was facially plausible and reversed the district court’s grant of Conver-
gent and LVNV’s motion to dismiss.274
The Fifth Circuit’s broad reading of the FDCPA falls in line with the
intent of the statute—consumer protection. The letter did not threaten
litigation, but the Debtor had a viable claim, and point of argument, that
inclusion of settlement language is misleading to an unsophisticated con-
sumer. It will be interesting to see how this case plays out on the merits,
especially in light of the Supreme Court case of Midland Funding, LLC v.
266. Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2015).
267. Id. at 300–400.
268. Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2001).
269. Id.
270. Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32–33 (3d Cir. 2011).
271. Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 2016).
272. Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 399; McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020
n.1 (7th Cir. 2014).
273. Daugherty, 836 F.3d at 513.
274. Id. at 513–14.
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Johnson.275 If the Fifth Circuit’s consumer-friendly decision is telling,
then creditors and debt collectors beware. However, if Johnson holds, the
floodgates may be opened and the script flipped—debtors would need to
be weary. This is a case to keep an eye on, as it should illuminate, at least
some, to the potential breadth of Johnson and the implications it could
have on debt collection practices.
VII. CLAIMS
A. IGNORANCE IS NOT ALWAYS BLISS: FAILURE TO LIST A
POTENTIALLY BAD DEBT IN A PREVIOUS BANKRUPTCY PETITION
HAS JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT—FEUERBACHER V.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
In Feuerbacher v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,276 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that even though a debtor did not know
about a claim at the time of filing for bankruptcy, she can be judicially
estopped from making that claim in the future. Ignorantia juris non ex-
cusat277 has long been a mantra of the law—the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed
that principle.278
In 2006, Alan Feuerbacher (Alan) sought a home equity loan.279 He
found a company that provided him such loan (the Note). Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), acted as the holder of the Note and was as-
signed the Security Instrument by Sand Canyon Corporation (Sand
Canyon).280
In October 2009, Billie Feuerbacher (Billie), Alan’s wife, filed for
bankruptcy. She represented in her bankruptcy that “she did not have
any ‘contingent and unliquidated claims of [any] nature, including tax re-
funds, counterclaims of the debtor, and rights to setoff claims.’”281 She
also claimed that she had been making payments on the home equity loan
and “that she intended to retain the property and reaffirm the debt.”282
Billie was granted a discharge in January 2010.283
In March 2013, Ocwen Loan Servicing (Ocwen) began to service the
Note. Later in 2013, the Feuerbachers defaulted on their home equity
loan. After they defaulted, Wells Fargo sought and gained approval to
foreclose on the Feuerbachers’ home. In January 2015, the Feuerbachers
filed suit against Wells Fargo, Sand Canyon, and Ocwen (collectively, the
Defendants) seeking to vacate the order permitting the foreclosure. They
claimed that the loan was invalid from its inception due to violations of
275. 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017) (Breyer, J.) (discussed previously).
276. 701 F. App’x 297 (5th Cir. 2017).
277. “Ignorance of the law excuses not.”
278. Feuerbacher, 701 F. App’x at 300.
279. A home equity loan is a loan where the borrower uses the equity he has already
put into his house as collateral against the loan.
280. Feuerbacher, 701 F. App’x at 298.
281. Id. at 299.
282. Id.
283. Id.
66 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
the Texas State Constitution.284
The procedural history of this case is confusing, but the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas ultimately granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the Defendants based on judicial estoppel.285 On appeal,
the Feuerbachers argued that the district court erred in using judicial es-
toppel to resolve this case. They asserted three specific grounds: (1) “their
quiet title and breach of contract claims did not accrue until after the
bankruptcy proceeding”; (2) judicial estoppel does not apply because
they are dealing with exempt property (their homestead); and (3) a “lien
cannot be estopped into existence” and thus judicial estoppel cannot
apply.286
The Fifth Circuit resolved two of the three arguments the Feuerbachers
raised by dismissing them, mainly because they failed to raise these issues
in district court. The only issue the Fifth Circuit discussed was if the quiet
title and breach of contract claims accrued when Billie filed for
bankruptcy.287
The Fifth Circuit took particular note with the fact that Billie did not
list any of the claims raised in this suit as potential claims in her schedule
when she filed for bankruptcy in 2009. In response, the Feuerbachers ar-
gued that they had no duty to disclose the claims because they were not
“potential claims.”288 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the claims
should have been disclosed, and the failure to disclose them in 2009 judi-
cially estopped the Feuerbachers from claiming them in 2015.289
The holding by the Fifth Circuit was based on “well-settled” Texas
law.290 “Under Texas law, ‘[c]auses of action accrue . . . when facts come
into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy.’”291
The cause of action came into existence when Billie Feuerbacher signed
the home equity loan agreement back in 2006, and her failure to list the
potential claims in her 2009 bankruptcy schedules barred her from raising
the issues entirely.292
This appears to be a rather harsh judgment against the Feuerbachers,
and more generally, debtors. The Feuerbachers’ contentions might have
had merit, which in turn could have allowed the Feuerbachers to avoid
foreclosure. Invalidity of the loan would have given them a fresh start,
but instead, the Feuerbachers were strung to the terms of a potentially
invalid home equity loan.
284. Id.
285. Feuerbacher v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 4:15-CV-59, 2016 WL 3669744, at *9 (E.D.
Tex. July 11, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Feuerbacher v. Wells Fargo Bank, 701 F. App’x 297 (5th
Cir. 2017).
286. Feuerbacher v. Wells Fargo Bank, 701 F. App’x 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2017).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 301.
290. Id.
291. Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 202 (Tex.
2011)); see Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. 2002).
292. Feuerbacher, 701 F. App’x at 301.
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A debtor looking to file bankruptcy with existing loans or agreements
they plan to reaffirm may think twice before doing so. Debtors must now
be entirely sure that they have no issues or claims with a contract before
omitting those potential claims from their bankruptcy schedules. This
may lead a debtor to hire a lawyer in an effort to ensure there are no
loose claims. Lawyers cost money, and what is seen as a rather miniscule
act may in turn drain the estate of valuable resources that could be used
to pay other creditors. But, debtors need to be diligent in assessing poten-
tial claims of the estate, and expenditure of estate funds to do so seems
necessary in light of this ruling.
And as to creditors, the reliance on bankruptcy schedules to show these
potential claims could be of great benefit. It seems they can now confi-
dently assert the defense that a claim is time barred when it is left out of a
bankruptcy petition. This ruling enhances the power of judicial estoppel
and adds another arrow to creditors’ quivers.
B. NO ASSETS, NO PROBLEM: FIFTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT A
NO-ASSET BANKRUPTCY DOES NOT TRIGGER THE CLAIMS
ALLOWANCE PROCESS IN KIPP FLORES ARCHITECTS, LLC
V. MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY COMPANY
In Kipp Flores Architects, L.L.C. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Company,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit clarified that in a no-asset
bankruptcy, a creditor’s proof of claim for copyright infringement dam-
ages is not deemed allowed.293 A no-asset bankruptcy does not trigger
the claims allowance process; therefore, any claim a creditor may bring is
superfluous and does not require an objection from the trustee, debtor, or
the court.294 If a claim is not deemed allowed, then it cannot be used as a
final judgment to force collection against a debtor’s liability insurer.
Kipp Flores Architects, L.L.C. (KFA) sold house designs to Hallmark
Collection of Homes L.L.C. (Hallmark Collection), authorizing a one-
time use of each design. If Hallmark Collection used a design more than
once, KFA would be compensated by Hallmark Collection an additional
amount based on the number of designs used.
Hallmark Collection built several hundred homes from KFA’s designs
without paying the additional fees. In response, KFA filed suit for copy-
right infringement. The suit named several defendants: Hallmark Collec-
tion, Hallmark Design Homes, L.P. (Hallmark Design), and Joe Partain
(an owner of Hallmark Collection). In the middle of the suit, both Hall-
mark Collection and Hallmark Design filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.295
293. Kipp Flores Architects, L.L.C. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 852 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.
2017). A no-asset bankruptcy is a bankruptcy proceeding where the debtor has no assets
that can be liquidated to pay claims to its creditors. See id. at 411. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) reads:
“A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is generally
deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (West 2005).
294. Kipp Flores, 852 F.3d at 413.
295. Id. at 407.
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Hallmark Collection was a no-asset bankruptcy with liabilities of about
$2.5 million. KFA had an unsecured non-priority claim for its pending
lawsuit against Hallmark Collection. KFA filed a proof of claim for
$63.471 million against Hallmark Collection’s estate for the potential cop-
yright infringement damages.296 The claim received no objection or re-
sponse from the trustee or Hallmark Collection, nor did the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issue an order in
regard to KFA’s claim.297 Hallmark Collection’s estate had no proceeds
to distribute to creditors, and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas closed the case five weeks later.298
Remember, Hallmark Design’s bankruptcy was still ongoing. The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas in that bankruptcy lifted
the automatic stay to allow KFA to continue with its copyright suit. KFA
eventually won that suit and was awarded $3.231 million in damages.
“KFA was granted an ‘allowed unsecured claim’ for $3,239,688.40 in the
Hallmark Design bankruptcy.”299 After some challenge, Mid-Continent
Casualty Co. (Mid-Continent), the insurer for Hallmark Design, paid
about $3 million on behalf of its client for KFA’s claim. While litigation
over the award from Hallmark Design was pending, KFA demanded
Mid-Continent do the same regarding Hallmark Collection—pay the $6
million face value policy it had for Hallmark Collection based on the final
judgment of KFA’s proof of claim in Hallmark Collection’s bankruptcy.
Mid-Continent refused to pay the claim and KFA filed suit for breach of
contract. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas as-
signed the case to pretrial management. The magistrate judge heard the
case and ruled against KFA.300 The magistrate judge held that because
the Hallmark Collection bankruptcy was a no-asset bankruptcy, the
claims allowance process had never been triggered. The district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and KFA appealed to
the Fifth Circuit.301
On appeal, KFA argued that the district court created an improper ex-
ception for no-asset bankruptcies at odds with the plain meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code.302 KFA believed that an unobjected-to claim consti-
tuted a final judgment under Section 502(a).303 KFA also argued Mid-
Continent, as a “party in interest,” had a duty to object to the claim if it
disagreed. Since Mid-Continent did not object, KFA could hold its claim
as a final judgment against the insurer to indemnify its client, Hallmark
296. These damages were calculated from Hallmark Collection’s gross income from the
sales of the KFA designed homes. Id. at 408.
297. Id. at 407–08.
298. Id. at 408.
299. Id.





Collection.304 Mid-Continent responded that the Bankruptcy Code, if
looked at in its entirety, required that assets must be available in a
debtor’s estate for a creditor to file an actionable proof of claim. Mid-
Continent argued that the allowance of KFA’s claim “served no bank-
ruptcy purpose because there were no assets to be marshalled and distrib-
uted among creditors.”305
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis with a thorough statutory interpre-
tation of Bankruptcy Code § 502(a). The Fifth Circuit immediately sought
guidance outside this one section, and instead looked at the Bankruptcy
Code in its entirety. The Fifth Circuit considered the multiple, different
uses and definitions of key words found throughout § 502(a), and, more
broadly, the entire Bankruptcy Code. The Fifth Circuit narrowed its focus
to the use of the word “may,” and how the Bankruptcy Code often refer-
ences what a creditor “may,” “shall,” or “must” do.306 In a number of
cases, and in-line with the Bankruptcy Rules, the court found that a credi-
tor is often requested to not file a proof of claim unless there is the “pos-
sibility of asset distribution.”307 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit found that
if an asset is discovered during a bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy
court will give notice to creditors that they should file proofs of claims.
This notice protects creditors and would have protected KFA just the
same.308
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit took a practical approach, evaluating
what a party in interest involved in a no-asset bankruptcy should do if it is
in a similar situation as Mid-Continent. Harping on judicial economy, the
Fifth Circuit found that “[s]ection 502(a) would be significantly trans-
formed if . . . certain ‘parties in interest’ in no asset cases would be re-
quired to monitor, object to, and litigate proofs of claim that need not
even be filed.”309 The fear that parties in interest would have to con-
stantly lookout for claims in situations that did not make sense worried
the Fifth Circuit.
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that KFA’s interpretation of § 502(a)
was too strict.310 KFA did not need to file a proof of claim in an estate
with no assets, and in fact, such action is generally wasteful. Nothing in
the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rules, nor in applicable case law re-
quired claims allowance in this situation. No notice was ever given to
creditors about raising claims because no assets were ever discovered by
the court. Furthermore, “no bankruptcy purpose would have been served
by [adjudication of] KFA’s claim.”311 Therefore, KFA did not have a
304. A party in interest is generally a debtor, creditor, trustee, indenture trustee, or an
equity security holder. Id. at 413.
305. Id. at 409.
306. Id. at 410–11.
307. Id. at 412.
308. Id. at 413.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 415–16.
311. Id. at 416.
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“deemed allowed” claim that constituted res judicata against Mid-
Continent.312
This opinion’s result is quite practical. The outcome of this case lifts the
burden off the shoulders of debtors and parties in interest in no-asset
bankruptcies. While maybe already assumed, this clarification also bene-
fits creditors, who can breathe easier knowing that their rights will be
protected in a no-asset bankruptcy case even in the absence of filing a
proof of claim. Instead of constantly being on guard for claims to object
to, debtors and parties in interest can now confidently focus attention to
more pressing matters. Overall, this decision acts to better streamline the
bankruptcy process by avoiding clogs through unnecessary proof of
claims by creditors. The Fifth Circuit’s recognition of the need for judicial
economy rendered a ruling that is in line with the Bankruptcy Code and
the bankruptcy process.
VIII. PROCEDURE
A. KNOW THE RULES: CONFUSING THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY
PROCEDURE IS NOT EXCUSABLE NEGLECT IN
NETSCH V. SHERMAN (MATTER OF
PRISM GRAPHICS, INC.)
In Netsch v. Sherman, counsel’s actions—confusing filing deadlines in
regards to an appeal—did not rise to excusable neglect under Bankruptcy
Rule 8002(d)(1)(B).313 Interpreting and applying U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
attorneys who operate within bankruptcy proceedings should know the
Bankruptcy Code. A simple mistake confusing deadlines between the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure is no excuse.314
On November 20, 2014, in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy adversary proceed-
ing, the bankruptcy court entered a final judgment against the debtor’s
principal and an associated entity (the Defendants) under a fraudulent
transfer theory.315 The Defendants intended to appeal the ruling. The
deadline to file an appeal was December 4, 2014 (fourteen days per the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure).316 The Defendants’ counsel
mistakenly believed he had until December 18, 2014, to file (twenty-eight
days per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).317
312. Id. at 415–16.
313. Matter of Prism Graphics, Inc., 666 F. App’x 355, 357–58 (5th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam).
314. Id.
315. This was the date of an amended final judgment the court entered due to clerical
error.
316. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002(a)(1).
317. Matter of Prism Graphics, 666 F. App’x at 356.
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Upon realizing his mistake, the Defendants’ counsel filed a motion to
extend time and an untimely notice of appeal on December 16, 2014, af-
ter the deadline established under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Pro-
cedure. Counsel urged the court to grant the motion to extend time and
allow the appeal under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(d)(1)(B) due to “excusable
neglect” (the applicable standard).318 The bankruptcy court denied the
motion, ruling that this kind of mistake did not rise to excusable neglect
and an extension was therefore not permitted. The U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas affirmed and the Defendants appealed to
the Fifth Circuit.319
On appeal, the Defendants argued “that the bankruptcy court and dis-
trict court improperly applied the factors articulated in Pioneer by placing
undue emphasis on a single factor.”320 There are four Pioneer factors that
would justify such delay: “(1) ‘whether the movant acted in good faith’;
(2) ‘the danger of prejudice’ to the nonmovant; (3) ‘the length of the de-
lay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings’; and (4) ‘the reason
for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of
the movant.’”321 The Defendants argued that the courts overemphasized
the fourth factor (the reason for delay), and such overemphasis changed
the test articulated in Pioneer from a balancing test to an all-or-nothing
test. The Defendants also contended that the merits of the case rose to
excusable neglect under Rule 8002.322
After evaluating the bankruptcy court’s use of the factors, the Fifth
Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the lower courts, conceding that the
first three factors of Pioneer weighed in favor of the Defendants and their
counsel, but that the fourth factor—reason for the delay—weighed
strongly against a finding of excusable neglect, so much so that the coun-
sel’s actions could not constitute excusable neglect.323 Of particular im-
portance was the fact that the parties had been using the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure throughout the adversary proceeding: these rules
were known to the parties, and the parties had no difficulty following
these rules until the mistake.324
In Pioneer, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically noted that “inadver-
tence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usu-
ally constitute excusable neglect.”325 Relying heavily on this precedent,
and citing one Fifth Circuit case that followed the same interpretation
about rule mistakes, the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court
properly applied the Pioneer factors and that counsel’s mistake was not
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 356; Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380
(1993).
321. Matter of Prism Graphics, 666 F. Appx. at 356–57; see Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395.
322. Matter of Prism Graphics, 666 F. App’x at 357.
323. Id. at 357–58.
324. Id. at 357.
325. Id. at 358–59; see Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392.
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excusable neglect—the motion to extend time was properly denied.326
The Fifth Circuit solidified the approach used to determine excusable
neglect under Federal Bankruptcy Rule of Civil Procedure 8002. In ap-
plying Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit solidified that Pioneer
is supposed to be a balancing test, not an all-or-nothing test. That said,
one factor can weigh so heavily against a party to render the other factors
almost obsolete. In determining excusable neglect, courts will holistically
look at the situation and make a determination on a case-by-case basis.
All circumstances surrounding the parties’ mistakes will be considered.
Given the outcome of this case, and the circumstances (one factor weigh-
ing so heavily against a party as to render the three other factors non-
meritorious), “excusable neglect” appears to be a demandingly high
burden.327
The authors included a discussion of this case as a practical matter; it
serves as an important reminder for lawyers operating in bankruptcy
courts who may not be entirely familiar with the Federal Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure—sometimes mistakes are not forgiven. Though mis-
takes will be made, this Fifth Circuit ruling reaffirming the Pioneer
factors makes clear that mistakes will not be undone unless the conduct
rises to the level of excusable neglect, which Prism Graphics hints is a
high burden to meet. It is important to always be mindful, for both you
and more importantly the client, of what rules control.
IX. CONCLUSION
Hopefully the reader learned something useful from this year’s selec-
tion of bankruptcy cases. Perhaps, at least, how to stay out of trouble!
326. See Halicki v. La Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 1998); Matter of
Prism Graphics, 666 F. App’x at 358.
327. Matter of Prism Graphics, 666 F. App’x at 356, 358.
